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Animal Welfare1 
Peter Sandøe 
 
‘Animal welfare’ is a wide-ranging, and often value-laden, term that is used with somewhat different 
meanings by different people. It appears to have been first used by Major C. W. Hume, who was 
instrumental in founding the University of London Animal Welfare Society in 1926. 
 
In non-technical assertions like ‘securing the welfare of animals in our care is vital’ the term ‘welfare’ refers 
to positive well-being or quality of life. In the technical literature on animal welfare, by contrast, it makes 
sense to speak about welfare as a continuum running from negative to positive. In some contexts (e.g. in the 
notion of an animal welfare organisation) the phrase ‘animal welfare’ carries the implication that we have an 
ethical obligation to treat animals well, or so as to meet certain minimum standards. However, many 
academics who study the living conditions of domestic and wild animals normally aim to use the term 
‘animal welfare’ descriptively simply to record the state in which an animal happens to be, without implying 
anything normative about the acceptability of the conditions in which the animal is kept. Also, in the 
academic study of animal welfare the term is normally used strictly to describe reactions of the individual 
animal being studied: welfare is a state of the animal. Here ‘welfare’ is used as a synonym of ‘well-being’ or 
‘quality of life’, whereas in other, non-academic, contexts it can be used in statements about the environment 
in which the animals live. 
 
The study of animal welfare is mainly undertaken as a part of natural science, building on disciplines such as 
ethology, pain- and stress-physiology and veterinary medicine. However, important underpinnings of the 
study of animal welfare are philosophical in nature. Before studying animal welfare, we need a definition 
that clarifies what it is for an animal to be in conditions that are good for it and what it is for an animal to live 
a good life.  From philosophical discussion of human well-being dating back to ancient Greece, two main 
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views about the nature of welfare emerge: perfectionism (and associated objectivist views), according to 
which welfare is connected with doing well, e.g. by realising important species-specific potentials; and 
hedonism (and allied subjectivist views), in which welfare is connected with feeling well, e.g. in the 
experience of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. 
 
Often advocates of these rather different views will arrive at similar conclusions about what is needed for an 
animal to live a good life. Positive feelings typically follow if an animal is allowed to pursue its natural 
goals, and pain or feelings of frustration may follow if an animal is thwarted in what it is naturally disposed 
to do. (Hens in battery cages appear to experience frustration when they are prevented from laying eggs in a 
nest.) However, it is not difficult to think of cases in which the two views might well diverge. Fighting to rise 
in the social hierarchy is natural in many animals and therefore positive on a perfectionist view. Nevertheless 
a hedonist may consider it desirable to prevent painful fights — perhaps by limiting the aggression of male 
individuals through castration. 
 
It is fair to say that subjectivist views presently dominate academic discussion of animal welfare. When Ian 
Duncan (1996) states that “… sentience, in other words feelings, is what animal welfare is all about” he is 
presenting a mainstream view. However, there are dissenting views. Bernard Rollin (1993) has observed: “It 
is likely that the emerging social ethic for animals ... will demand from scientists data relevant to a much 
increased concept of welfare.  Not only will welfare mean control of pain and suffering, it will also entail 
nurturing and fulfilment of the animals’ natures, which I call telos.” Again, in the following influential 
definition offered by Donald Broom (1986), the emphasis is on coping, or functioning — a basic form of 
perfection — rather than on feeling, although Broom himself acknowledges that feelings may be an 
important part of functioning: “The welfare of an individual is its state as regards its attempts to cope with its 
environment. Coping can sometimes be achieved with little effort and expenditure of resources, in which 
case the individual’s welfare is satisfactory. Or it may fail to cope at all, in which case its welfare is 
obviously poor. Or, if the individual does cope with the conditions it encounters, this may be easy, with little 
expenditure of resources, or may be difficult taking much time and energy, in which case welfare is deemed 
to be poor.” 
 
Well-being can be measured in a variety of ways. Each method of measurement tends to suit some 
definitions of welfare better than others. Measures focusing on biological, psychological and social 
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functioning are readily understood within a perfectionist framework. If, on the other hand, the researcher 
allows the animals to rank different outcomes, or concentrates on psychological well-being and distress, the 
measurements will make more sense in a hedonist (or, more broadly, subjectivist) framework. So researchers 
need to consider whether and how the data they record can be interpreted so as to say something about well-
being in a specified sense. Measures of functioning often indicate little, directly at least, about pleasure, 
suffering and other subjective states of animals. It follows that the use of these measures within a subjectivist 
view of animal welfare requires critical discussion. 
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